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S'rATE FAR::Vf ETC. INs. Co.

F. No.19562.

v. SuPERIOR CouR'r

In Bank.

r47 C.2d

Dec. 4,

STA'fE FAR1VI MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY
Corporation), Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COlTH:r OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF
SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent; HEI1EN CORRICK
et
Real Parties in Interest.
[la, lb] Trial-Joint and Separate Trials-Consolidation.-The
trial court abused its discretion in ordering consolidation for
trial of a declaratory relief action by an insurer against its
policyholder to determine whether the policy covered a collision
of vehicles, one of which was operated by the insured, and
seYeral personal injury actions filed against the insured, where
the consolidation resulted in prejudice to the insurer (Code
Civ. Proc., § 1048) in that in the declaratory relief action the
insurer would be urging on its own behalf that the insured's
riders were passengers "for a charge" within the meaning of
the policy, but in defending the insured in the personal injury
actions the insurer would be urging on the insured's behalf that
his riders were guests within the meaning of the guest statute,
so that the insured would be liable only in the event of proof
of wilful misconduct (Veh. Code, § 403), and where the consolidation would confuse the jury in determining under differing tests set out in the instructions the consequences of any
particular factual situation found to exist.
[2] Judgments-Declaratory Judgments-Effect of Issues of Fact.
- I f the issues of fact arising would have been triable by a
jury as of right in an action which might have been substituted for a declaratory relief action by either party, there is
a right to jury trial on such issues.
[3] !d.-Declaratory Judgments-Effect of Issues of Fact.-The
court in a declaratory relief action may not, regardless of the
circumstances, dispose of all factual issues without a jury,
since this would not preserve the distinction between legal
and equitable issues. (Disapproving contrary holding m
Kaliterna v. Wright, 94 Cal.App.2d 926, 212 P.2d 32.)
[1] See Cal.Jur., Trial, § 5; Am.Jur., Trial, §53 et seq.
[2] Jury trial in action for declaratory relief, note, 13 A.L.R.2d
777. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Declaratory Relief, § 43; Am.Jur., Declaratory .Tudgments, § 70.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Trial, § 5; [2-4] Judgments, § 9(2);
[5] Mandamus,§ 41;
Appeal and Error,§ 1223; [7] Mandamus,
§ 15(5); [8] Judgments, 13; [9] Judgments,§ 14; [10] Mandamus,
§55.
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[4] !d.-Declaratory Judgments-Effect of Issues of Fact.-The
courts will not permit a
relief action to be used
as a device to circumvent the
to a
trial in cases
where such
would be
if the
were
coerci\·e rather than
[5) Mandamus-To Courts.~J\Iandate lies
control
cretion when such discretion has been abused.

dis-

[6] Appeal-Discretion of Lower Court-When Abused.-Discrction is abused whenever, in it,;
a court exceeds the
bounds of reason, all circmnstancPs before it being considered.
[7] Mandamus-Existence of Other Remedy.--An order of consolidation is not appealable (Code Civ. Proc., § 9G3), but is
reviewable only on appeal [rom a subsequent judgment, and a
writ of mandate ordering a severance will issue where the
remedy by appeal would be inadequate.
[8] Judgments-Declaratory Judgments-Discretion of Court.'fhe entertainment of a declaratory relief action and the
granting of such relief are within the discretionary power of
the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1061.)
[9] !d.-Declaratory Judgments-Discretion of Court.-While
Code Civ. Proc., § 10G2a, provides that declaratory relief actions
shall be set [or trial at the earliest possible date and ordinarily
shall take precedence over all other cases, such section does
not override the discretionary power given the trial court to
refuse to exercise the power granted it in any case where its
declaration or determination is not necessary or proper at the
time under all circumstances. (Code Ci v. Proc., § 1061.)

(10] Mandamus-To Courts-TriaL-Though personal InJury
actions against the insured were in issue and set for trial
before a declaratory relief action by the insurer was at issue,
Code Civ. Proc., § 1063a, was not intended to compel the trial
court under such circumstances to delay the trial of the
coercive actions until after trial of the declaratory relief
action merely because the coercive actions might involve determination of the same or a somewhat similar issue.

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the Superior Court
of the City and County of San Francisco to sever a declaratory
relief action from personal injury actions and to proceed :first
with trial of the declaratory relief action. Writ granted solely
for purpose of compelling court to sever the actions.
[5] See Cal.Jur., l\Iandamus, § 34; Am.Jur., Mandamus, § 259.
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Bledsoe, Smith, Cathcart, Johnson & Phelps and Joseph W.
Rogers, Jr., for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Delany, Fishgold & Freitas and Matthew M. Fishgold for
Real Parties in Interest.
SPENCE, J.-Petitioner seeks a writ of mandate to compel
respondent court to sever its declaratory relief action from
certain personal injury actions and to proceed first with the
trial of its declaratory relief action. It contends that respondent court abused its discretion (1) in ordering the consolidation for trial of the declaratory relief action and the personal
injury actions; and (2) in failing to order that the declaratory
relief action be tried prior to the trial of the personal injury
actions. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1062a.) We have concluded that
petitioner's position should be sustained as to the first point
but not as to the second point.
Petitioner commenced a declaratory relief action against its
policyholder Collins to determine whether its policy covered
a collision of two automobiles, one of which was operated by
Collins. Persons riding in both cars were injured. While
the declaratory relief action was pending, several personal
injury actions were filed against Collins. The personal injury
actions were at issue and were consolidated for a jury triaL
Thereafter the declaratory relief action was set for trial,
with a jury as demanded by defendants, and for the same
clay previously set for trial of the personal injury actions.
Petitioner's motion to vacate the order for a jury trial in the
declaratory relief action was denied, and defendants' motion
to consolidate that action with the personal injury actions
was then granted. The trial date for the personal injury
actions was not a date certain but the time when the cases
should be ready for trial and thereafter would "trail," subject
to being called for assignment when a department was available.
[la] Petitioner concedes that ''actions may be consolidated, in the discretion of the court, whenever it can be done
without prejudice to a substantial right.'' (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1048.) However, as petitioner contends, the consolidation
here does result in such prejudice to petitioner. In seeking
damages against Collins for their injuries, the riders in his
car charged him with both negligence and wilful misconduct
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but did not allege their status, whether passengers or guests,
at the time of the accident. Petitioner's policy provided that
there was no coverage while the insured's automobile was
''used as a public or livery conveyance, or used for carrying
persons for a charge,'' with the exception of persons sharing
expenses, going to and from work or school. The order for
consolidation puts petitioner in an inconsistent position for
argument of the status of Collins' riders in the consolidated
in the declaratory relief action petitioner would
actions:
be urging on its own behalf that Collins' riders were passengers ''for a charge'' within the meaning of the policy; but
( 2) in defending Collins in the personal injury actions, petitioner would be urging on Collins' behalf that his riders were
guests within the meaning of the guest statute, so that Collins
would be liable only in the event of proof of wilful misconduct.
(Veh. Code, §403; Pennix v. Winton, 61 Cal.App.2d 761 [143
P.2d 940, 145 P.2d 561].) The tests for determining these
respective issues in the actions thus consolidated would not be
the same. A person may be a traveler for ''compensation''
under the guest law but not necessarily a "passenger" for
"consideration" or "for a charge" under an insurance policy.
(Westem JJiach. Co. V. Bankers Indem. Ins. ao., 10 Cal.2d
488, 490-491 [75 P.2d 609] ; Porter v. Employers etc. Corp.,
Ltd., 40 Cal.App.2d 502, 506-510 [104 P.2d 1087].) Substantially the same evidence might be involved in the adjudication
of these issues, but petitioner would be forced into contradictory arguments based upon conflicting testimony, or at
least upon conflicting inferences arising from the evidence,
with regard to these distinguishable relationships. Moreover,
the consolidation would unquestionably confuse the jury in
determining under differing tests set out in the instructions
the consequences of any particular factual situation which the
jury might find to exist.
Petitioner does not now challenge the propriety of respondent's granting a jury trial in the declaratory relief action.
[2] The general rule is stated in 13 American Law Reports
2d at page 778: " . . . if the issues of fact arising would have
been triable by a jury as of right in an action which might
have been substituted for the declaratory judgment action by
either party, then there is a right to jury trial on such issues.''
[3] While Kaliterna v. Wright, 94 Cal.App.2d 926 [212 P.2d
32], appears to hold that, regardless of the circumstances, the
court in a declaratory relief action may dispose of all factual
issues without a jury, such view fails to preserve the distinc-
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tion between
and equitable
and it must be disapproved. (See Robinson v. Pnls, 28 Cal.2d 664, 665-666 [171
P.2d 430].
[4] In short, the "courts will not permit the
declaratory action to be used as a device to circumvent the
right to a jury trial in cases where such right would be guaranteed if the proceeding were coercive rather than declaratory
in nature." (15
§
pp. 172-173; see Pacific
Electric Ry. Co. v. Dewey, 95 Ca1.App.2d
71-72 [212
P.2d 255] ; JJiallarino v.
Cmtrt, 115 Cal.App.2d 781,
.) [lb] However, petitioner properly
784 [252 P.2d
complains of the order for consolidation here in that it pro·
vides for the trial of both the declaratory relief action and
the personal injury actions before the same jury. The fact
of Collins' liability insurance would thus be disclosed to the
jury which would be determining the issues involved in the
personal injury actions, a circumstance which is generally
held a matter of prejudice. (See cases collected: 11 So. Cal.
hRev. 407; 21 So.Cal.IJ.Rev. 227.) It is therefore clear
that the declaratory relief action and the personal injury
actions could not be consolidated for trial "without prejudice
to a substantial right" of petitioner, and that the trial court
abused its discretion in ordering such consolidation.
[5] Mandate lies to control judicial discretion when that
discretion has been abused. (Hays v. Superior Court, 16
Cal.2d 260, 265 [105 P.2d 975] ; Simmons v. Superior Cmtrt,
96 Cal.App.2d 119, 132 [214 P.2d 844, 19 A.L.R.2d 288] ;
Grorneeko v. Superior Court, 114 Cal.App.2d 754, 757 [251
P.2d 29].) [6] "In a legal sense discretion is abused whenever in the exercise of its discretion the court exceeds the
bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being
considered." (Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal.App.2d 669, 672 [169
P.2d 453] .) [7] An order of consolidation is not appealable (Code Civ. Proc., § 963) but is reviewable only upon
appeal from a subsequent judgment, which remedy would not
be adequate under the circumstances above reviewed. (l.E.S.
Corp. v. Super-ior Co1£rt, 44 Cal.2d 559, 564 [283 P.2d 700] ;
see Phelan v. Superior Court, 35 Cal.2d 363, 370 [217 P.2d
951].) We therefore conclude that petitioner is entitled to
a writ of mandate ordering respondent to sever its declaratory
relief action from the personal injury actions.
[8] However, petitioner may not insist that the declaratory relief action be tried first. The entertainment of such
action and the granting of declaratory relief are matters
within the discretionary power of the court. (Code Civ. Proc.,
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1061; Hannula v. Hacienda
Inc., 34 Cal.2d 442, 448
[211 P.2d 302, 19 A.L.R.2d 1268] .) (9] It is true that it
is provided that such actions "shall be set for trial at the
earliest possible date and shall take
of all other
cases, except older matters of the same character and matters
to which special precedence may be
by law." (Code
Civ. Proc., § 1062a.) But said section 1062a does not purport
to override the discretionary power given to the trial court
to ''refuse to exercise the power granted by this chapter in
any ease where its declaration or determination is not necessary or proper at the time under all the circumstances.'' (Code
Civ. Proc., § 1061.) The trial court therefore had, and still
has, the discretion to determine whether the declaratory relief
action should be entertained ''at the time under all the circumstances.'' In the present case, the personal injury actions
were at issue and set for trial before the declaratory relief
action was at issue. (10] In our view, section 1062a was
never intended under such circumstances to compel the trial
court to delay the trial of the coercive actions until after the
trial of the declaratory relief action merely because the
coercive actions might involve the determination of the same
or a somewhat similar issue. Any conclusion to the contrary
would permit the use of an action for declaratory relief as
a device to delay the trial of any such coercive action previously at issue and set for trial. vVe therefore conclude that
the trial court could have properly determined in its discretion, and may still determine following the severance, that
the granting of declaratory relief is not "necessary or proper
at the time under all the circumstances." There is therefore
no basis for the issuance of a writ of mandate commanding the
trial court to order the trial of the declaratory relief action
prior to the trial of the personal injury actions.
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue but solely for the
purpose of commanding respondent court to sever for trial
petitioner's declaratory relief action from the personal injury
actions hereinabove discussed.
Gibson, C.•J., Shenk, J., 'l'raylor, J., Schauer, J., and
McComb, ,J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
The majority holds that a trial court eannot in the exercise
of its discretion consolidate for trial an action by the plaintiffinsurer for declaratory J'elief to ascertain the rights and lia-
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bilities of the insurer and the insured under a policy of
public liability insurance on an automobile in which defendant
Collins is the insured, with an action by other plaintiffs
against Collins for personal injuries suffered by them when
riding with Collins in the automobile covered by such policy;
that mandamus is the appropriate method for reviewing the
consolidation order. It bases that holding on two grounds:
(1) That the insurer would be required to take inconsistent
positions in that it would argue that the personal injury
plaintiffs were passengers for hire and not covered by Collins'
policy on the one hand, and, as to the liability of Collins to
plaintiffs on the other, that they were mere guests, and wilful
misconduct by Collins would have to be shown to establish
his liability; ( 2) that the insurance coverage of Collins would
be injected into the personal injury action because of its consolidation with the declaratory relief action contrary to the
rule that the existence of insurance should be withheld from
the jury. I do not believe that either of these grounds will
stand analysis and that in any case mandamus is not the
proper remedy.
With respect to the inconsistent positions which it is claimed
the consolidation will require the insurer to take, it should
be first observed that the majority is itself inconsistent as it
arrives at the conclusion of inconsistent positions while at the
same time holding that a different test must be applied to
determine whether the personal injury plaintiffs were farepaying passengers and not covered by the policy, and to determine whether plaintiffs were guests, and hence whether negli·
gence or wilful misconduct must be proved.* There being a
different test, the insurer is not required to take inconsistent
positions. Hence there is no merit in that ground for denying
consolidation of the actions.
In addition, however, it should be noted that law suits are
not games in which the cleverest mover should prevail. The
ultimate factor involved is getting at the true facts and that
should not depend on some nice consideration for the contentions that may or may not be made by the opposing parties.
The insurer's position should be to urge what the evidence
fairly shows. The facts being ascertained, the law must be
applied thereto. Suppose the actions were not consolidated,
*It has been held (as stated by the majority) that the tests as to the
coverage of the policy and whether there is a passenger or guest relationship are different (Western Mach. Co. v. Bankers Indem. Ins. Co., 10
Cal.2d 488 [75 P.2d 609]; Porter v. Employers' etc. Corp., Ltd., 40 Cal.
App.2d 502 [104 P.2d 1087]
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would it be proper for the insurer to argue in one action
(declaratory relief) that the policy did not cover the accident
because the vehicle was for hire, and in the other, that it
was not, and thus plaintiffs were guests and must, therefore,
prove wilful misconduct on Collins' part 1 There would not
only be the ''embarrassment' of taking inconsistent positions,
assuming the positions would be incongruous, but there might
be a serious question as to whether both could stand on appeal.
As said in Southern Pac. Co. v. C'ity of Los Angeles, 5 Cal.2d
545, 548 [55 P.2d 847], speaking of two actions tried separately
in which different results were reached on substantially the
same evidence: ''It would be most anomalous for such decisions to stand, reaching diametrically opposite conclusions as
to the legal effect of the same occurrence, where the essential
facts are similarly presented, and are in most particulars undisputed. The rule that a reviewing court is bound by the
findings of the trial court on conflicting evidence cannot apply
to a situation such as this, where two lower courts, dealing
with substantially the same evidence, have reached different
conclusions of law, on the legal issue of whether from this
evidence legal responsibility is imposed by the law upon the
defendant. It is within the proper function of this court,
upon petition for hearing, to eliminate this confusion, and to
determine the legal effect of the evidence in both cases.'' Thus
I see nothing more disadvantageous to the insurer in trying
the matters together than in trying them separately. If inconsistent positions must be taken, that is because of the situation
presented over which none of the parties had control; it was
not created by the order for consolidation for trial. It must
be remembered that the same evidence, testimony of witnesses
(plaintiffs and Collins), as to the nature of the arrangement
between them in connection with their presence in Collins'
car would be used in both trials or one if there is consolidation.
Both parties will have to rely on the same witnesses, and the
inconsistency of positions, if there be such, is no greater for
the insurer than for the plaintiffs and Collins. If plaintiffs
establish only ordinary negligence they will want to urge that
there was a passenger-driver rather than guest-host relationship and thus risk having no coverage under the policy. It is
not reasonable to suppose that they want to jeopardize any
recovery by excluding the insurer as the one who would ultimately have to pay. Yet they make no objection to the consolidation; in fact, they initiated the move to obtain it. All
parties will have to do what is required of them in an endeavor

436

v.

SuPERIOR CouRT

C.2d

ascertain the true facts. At least that is a factor which
the trial court when it exercised
could have been considered
its discretion and consolidated the actions.
In regard to the existence of insurance coming before th!:'
it is clear that the insurer took the calculated risk of
that occur. In
action it named plaintiffs as well
as Collins defendants and claimed that a
trial was not
proper. It thus made known that plaintiffs were possible
claimants in a
injury action against Collins in which
it would be involved, and no doubt it considered that a judgment after a court trial in its favor would end the matter, or
in the event it lost, that it could still litigate the issue of
Collins' liability to plaintiffs. 'I' his considered course of conduct is tantamount to a 'Naiver on its part of the issue of
insurance coming into the case. It should have anticipated
that with plaintiffs named as defendants along with Collins in
its action, the evidence on the issue of insurance coverage
and liability would come from Collins and those plaintiffs
seeking damages for personal injuries against him, and that
the actions would be consolidated to save the duplication of
their testimony in two separate trials. Since the insurer's
action is one which may be tried by a jury, as held by the
majority, and the personal injury plaintiffs were defendants
in that action, the jury necessarily would be informed that
insurance was involved, it is not reasonable to hold that the
insurer has not forfeited any right to have insurance kept out
of the consolidated trial. The insurance issue was just as
much likely to affect the jury in one case as in the consolidated
cases. Moreover, •vith all the recent publicity that has been
given to insurance in automobile accident cases, stressing the
effect on premiums for such insurance, it cannot be said that
jurors are ignorant on the subject, nor that the insurers want
them to be. The claimed danger of injection of insurance
into the case has lost much of the sting assumed to exist
formerly. In recent widespread publicity jurors have been
told generally not to give large awards of damages and to
avoid g·iving any except in the clearest cases. Wbile it is
true that in an ordinary personal injury action, with minor
exceptions, the existence of insurance is not material to any
issue, it must be assumed that the jurors know that all motorists carry insurance. Where actions such as these are consolidated and insurance is material and relevant, the mention of
the insurance issue cannot possibly be considered prejudicial
to the insurer.
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The
discussion of waiver also stands as an answer
to the asserted embarrassment of the insurer in taking inconsistent positions. If the positions are inconsistent the insurer
has brought it on itself. It should be remembered that
inconsistent positions may be taken
a
in his complaint or by a defendant in the defenses pleaded in his
answer and no one is considered to be prejudicially embarrassed thereby. (21 CaLJur. 134-136; 9 So.CaLIJ.Rev. 388.)
Mandamus should not be granted in this case. There was
no palpable abuse of discretion by the trial court. The majority opinion fails to give consideration to all of the factors
considered by the trial court when it exercised its admitted
discretion and ordered consolidation.
It should first be noted that the basis of the majority finding
of abuse of discretion is wholly speculative and conjecturaL
It is supposed that the evidence will be such that the insurer
will have to argue for different results-one as to the insurance
policy coverage and the other as to the relation between
Collins and the riders in his car. \Ve do not know whether
that is true or not because we do not know what the evidence
will be; it may be that it will not call for any inconsistent
construction. As to the issue of insurance we should not
suppose that the jury will not be instructed to ignore the
insurance element in considering the liability of Collins to
plaintiffs in the personal injury action and that such instructions will be followed. The majority opinion assumes without
so stating that there will be no such instructions or at least
that the jury will not follow them. None of these things will
be known with clarity and certainty until after the consolidated cases are tried. Only then will this court be in a position
to ascertain whether there has been a miscarriage of justice.
Therefore mandamus is not the proper remedy at tl1is time.
The matter may be fairly determined only on appeal from the
judgment where the record will disclose what occurred at the
trial, and there may not be any claim of error insofar as the
question of consolidation is concerned, assuming the insurer
and Collins lose in the trial court. If they win, of course,
the question is moot.
The witnesses, including Collins, wl1o would be conversant
with the arrangement between Collins and plaintiffs are nonresidents and hence the difficulty and expense of having their
testimony available at two separate trials, if the cases are not
consolidated, is patent; yet the majority gives no considera-
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tion to that factor in determining whether the trial court
abused its discretion.
All of the foregoing matters point unerringly to a proper
exercise by the trial court of its discretion. It had to balance
those factors in arriving at a decision to consolidate the cases.
The majority does not show that the trial court did not weigh
the pertinent problems or that its sense of where the merits
fell was wanting in reasonableness or propriety.
It is obvious that this case will become the basis for numerous attempts of litigants to control the discretion of trial
courts in similar cases and thus interrupt the orderly disposition of business by our greatly overworked trial courts.
I would deny the petition for the writ.

[Crim. No. 5931.

In Bank.
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THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. CLIFFORD JEFFERSON,
Appellant.
[la, lb] Assault-By Life Convict-Indictment.-In a prosecution
for assault with a deadly weapon by a prisoner undergoing a
life sentence (Pen. Code, § 4500), it was not error to deny defendant's motion to set aside the indictment where the evidence before the grand jury disclosed that another prisoner
was waylaid by three men, two of whom had knives, that defendant was one of the men who had a knife, and that he inflicted wounds on such prisoner, since there was probable
ground for the grand jury's conclusion that defendant committed the offense charged. (Pen. Code, § 995, subd. 2.)
[2] Indictment and Information-Motion to Set Aside-Objections
to Grand Jurors ..-An indictment may not be set aside under
Pen. Code, § 995, on the ground that the foreman of the grand
jury did not comply with the requirements of Pen. Code, § 907,
requiring that he state the matter to be considered, the person
to be charged with an offense, and direct any prejudiced juror
to retire.
[3] Assault-By Life Convict-Validity of Statute.-Pen. Code,
§ 4500, making it an offense punishable with death for a life
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Indictment and Information, ~ 80; Am.Jur.,
Indictment and Information, § 157.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 9] Assault, § 4'1; [2] Indictment and
Information,§ 88(3); [3, 4, 8] Assault,§ 43;
10] Assault,§ 45;
[6, 7] Assault, § 46; [11] Evidence, § 33; [12] Assault, § 47.1;
[13] Criminal Law,§ 970(4).

